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General Article
RATIONAL VERSUS
PLAUSIBLE ACCOUNTING
EQUIVALENCES IN
PREFERENCE JUDGMENTS
by R. Duncan Luce
Subjective expected utility (SEU) embodies four distinct prin-
ciples of rational behavior. Although all have been called into
some question empirically, the least plausible and least studied
is the property that formally equivalent gambles are treated as
indifferent in preference. The paper describes some results that
arise when this property is sharply weakened and to some de-
gree replaced by alternative rational and not-so-rational-
assumptions. The resulting utility representations, like SEU,
are weighted averages of the utilities of consequences, but with
the weights dependent on more than the underlying chance
event. In rank-dependent cases, which arise from a restricted
assumption about formally equivalent gambles, the weights de-
pend on the rank position of the corresponding consequence. In
rank- and sign-dependent models, they depend both on the rank
position of the consequence associated to the event and on
whether it is a gain or a loss. The theory giving rise to the latter
involves an additional primitive, namely, joint receipt of gam-
bles, in terms of which new rational and irrational assumptions
are invoked. The result generalizes prospect theory to gambles
with more than a single gain and a single loss.
Many different qualitative axiomatizations exist for
preferences over uncertain alternatives (gambles) that all
lead to the well-known subjective expected utility (SEU)
or to expected utility (EU) representations (see, e.g.,
Fishbum, 1982, 1989). In one way or another each of
these axiomatizations embodies four fundamentally dif-
ferent principles of rationality together with some further
assumptions that entail a considerable richness to the
domain of gambles. Moreover, these four principles are
each implied by the representation.
Aside from the more-or-less extended philosophical
discussions about the logical status and actual rationality
of these postulates, a gradually growing literature has
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focussed upon their descriptive accuracy. One compre-
hensive analysis is MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979), and
Hogarth and Reder (1986) compiled a number of papers
on the subject. This empirical literature is not free from
controversy because it is less easy than one might first
anticipate to provide unambiguous empirical evidence
that bears on just a single principle without exphcitly or,
more often, implicitly invoking some of the others. De-
pending upon which principles one believes to have sur-
vived these tests, one develops altemative, more descrip-
tive theories. In some cases these theories are simply
generalizations of EU or SEU in the sense that some
principles are abandoned, others accepted, and nothing
inherently new and restrictive is added. In other cases,
however, altemative postulates are invoked which no
one claims to be aspects of rationality, but rather are
suggested as more-or-less plausible descriptive principles
or heuristics that actual decision makers may follow de-
spite their acknowledged "irrationality."
My goals in this expository paper are:
• To remind the reader of the four principles underlying
SEU.'
• To indicate which I am convinced are descriptively
inaccurate and so must be abandoned in a descriptive
theory and why I think so.
• To describe a weighted utility representation in which
the weights depend not only on the event underlying
the consequence but also on the relation of that con-
sequence to both the status quo and the other conse-
quence. This representation resembles SEU in some
respects but does not imply the unwanted principles.
Moreover, it generalizes prospect theory (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979), the binary rank-dependent (or dual-
bilinear) theory of Luce and Narens (1985), and the
general rank-dependent one of Luce (1988). It is re-
'The ones for EU are closely similar, but make explicit use of the
probabilities that are present.
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latcd lo the original rank-dependent theory of Quiggin
(1982) and later versions due to Gilboa (1987). Schmcid-
Icr (1984), and Yarri (1988). Much of this research is
summarized in Wakkcr (1989).
• To list several plausible postulates that result in that
representation but with the extra, and some may feel
undesirable, wrinkle that utility is additive over the
joint receipt of gambles.
THE FOUR PRINCIPLES OF RATIONALITY
UNDERLYING SEU
Probably the most basic principle is transitivity of pref-
erence for choices between pairs of alternatives: ifa^b,
that is. a is at least as preferable as b, and b ^ c, then a
s c. The standard argument given for transitivity, at least
for strict preferences, is that an intransitive person can be
made to serve as a money pump. For indifference, it is far
less clear that people should be transitive if there is a
threshold separating preferences from indifferences. Al-
temative postulates have been proposed (see, e.g., Fish-
bum, 1985), but effectively meshing intransitive indiffer-
ence with the other principles has proved relatively
intractable.
The second principle is a form of dominance that can
be described as follows: If a consequence in a gamble is
replaced by a more preferred consequence (where this
more preferred consequence may itself be a gamble),
then the resulting gamble is preferred to the original one.
This goes under many names, such as "independence,"
but mostly these terms refer to it in conjunction with one
or another accounting equivalence, discussed below, and
so I avoid using them. My preferred term is the mathe-
matical one, monotonicity, although dominance is good
except for the fact it is readily confused with the next
principle. Cancellation, another mathematical term, is
sometimes used, apparently always in isolation from
other principles.
The third is generally called stochastic dominance
when probabilities are known. There seems to be no
agreed upon term for uncertain events. Perhaps likeli-
hood dominance is suitable. For binary gambles (ones
with just two consequences), it says that if a new gamble
is formed by making the more preferred consequence
more likely, then the modified gamble will be preferred to
the original one.
The last principle of rationality asserts indifference be-
tween formally equivalent framings of a gamble. For a
general discussion of framing, see Tversky and Kahne-
man(1981, 1986). A major consequence of this postulate,
and the one used in the theories, is that one can always
reduce a compound gamble—one in extensive (or tree)
226
form—to its one-stage, formally equivalent normal form,
and the extensive form and its corresponding normal
form are indifferent in preference.
For money gambles with known probabilities, the last
principle means that such gambles can be treated as ran-
dom variables, and economists especially have grown so
accustomed to this simplifying feature that they typically
postulate a family of random variables as the domain over
which preferences are defined. This has been the case for
several versions of the rank-dependent theories that have
arisen in the 1980s; see below for some of the references.
It should always be recognized that this familiar step ei-
ther limits the theory to gambles in normal form—I call
them first-order gambles below—or if applied to higher-
order or compound gambles it implicitly invokes the
fourth, and very strong, principle of rationality.
In the absence of known probabilities, the assumption
of no framing effects continues to be very strong. It im-
plies the following concept of accounting equivalences:^
two gambles are judged indifferent if they give rise to the
same consequences under the same conditions, ignoring
the order in which different events are realized. Several
examples of such equivalences are discussed below.
As long as the domain of gambles is sufficiently rich
both in consequences and in chance events, these four
principles are sufficient to prove that there exists a real
valued function U over gambles that is order preserving
and a finitely additive probability measure P over events
such that the U value of a gamble is the expected value of
the U values of its primitive consequences relative to P.
To be quite explicit for the binary case, let ao^b denote
the gamble in which a is the consequence if the event E
occurs and b otherwise, then U satisfies:
= P(E)Via) - P{E)]XJ{b). (1)
Further, each of the rationality principles is implied by
such a representation. It is important to recognize that
this not only means that transitivity, monotonicity, and
likelihood dominance are implied by the representation,
as is widely acknowledged, but also that all possible ac-
counting equivalences are also implied. This says that
any two extensive forms having the same normal form
are seen to be equivalent and so indifferent.
WHICH PRINCIPLES FAIL DESCRIPTIVELY
The empirical literature conceming these principles is
too complex to be summarized here in detail. Rather, I
term apparently was first used in Luce and Narens (1985).
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focus on what, over time, has come to be regarded as the
major evidence against each principle.
The sharpest evidence against transitivity arises from
two classes of experiments. One is the often replicated
preference reversal experiment (see, e.g,. Bostic, Herrn-
stein, & Luce, 1990; Grether & Plott, 1979; Hamm. 1980;
Kami & Safra, 1987; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971, 1973;
Lindman, 1971; Mowen & Gentry. 1980; Pommerehne,
Schneider & Zweifel, 1982; Reilly, 1982; Slovic & Lich-
tenstein, 1983; Tversky, Sattath. & Slovic. 1988; Tver-
sky, Slovic, & Kahneman, 1990). Basically it has this
form. Within a larger context of selecting and evaluating
gambles, there are pairs of gambles embedded that have
the features that the two members of each pair have the
same expected value and one member of the pair, called
the $-gambIe, has a small probability of a reasonably
large payoff and the other, called the P-gamble. has a far
larger probability of a considerably more modest payoff.
Some one third to one half of subjects (of various types)
choose the /'-gamble when the choice is presented but
nevertheless assign an appreciably larger money value to
the $-gamble than to the P-gamble. If one assumes, as
seems to have been done, that the assigned money values
represent choice indifferences, then these observations
violate choice transitivity. Recently, several authors, us-
ing quite different experimental procedures, have raised
considerable doubt about the assumed equivalence be-
tween judged and choice indifferences, which raises
doubts about the degree to which these studies actually
provide any evidence against the transitivity of choices
(Bostic et al., 1990; Tversky et al., 1988, 1990). If these
doubts are sustained, then the assumption of transitivity
need not be discarded on the basis of apparent preference
reversals. But, equally important, if judged indifference
cannot be explained in terms of choices, then we must
develop an explicit theory for judged indifferences. Such
an additional theory is essential since such judgments of
money equivalents play an important role in many ap-
plied contexts including much of the work carried out by
decision analysts.
Tversky (1969) carried out a systematic study of the
intransitivities that can be generated when successive
pairs of altemative in a chain of them differ only slightly
in the probabilities; the small differences were apparently
ignored in favor of payoff differences. But between the
ends of the chain the probability, and associated EU,
difference is far too large to ignore. This phenomenon has
been replicated and further studied by Budescu and
Weiss (1987), Lindman and Lyons (1978), Montgomery
(1977), and Ranyard (1977). It appears to be a pervasive
failure of transitivity that is due primarily to insufficient
attention being paid to small differences. Researchers dif-
fer in the weight they give to these demonstrations. From
a theoretical perspective, it appears to be somewhat
messy to take it into account—for example, it has proved
difficult to combine any kind of structure with the ordinal
generalization of weak orders to semi- or interval-orders.
In sum, although some evidence questions the descrip-
tive accuracy of transitivity, I along with many other
theorists believe that it is accurate enough to assume as a
first, and certainly a normatively compelling, approxima-
tion.
Turning to monotonicity, the major phenomenon usu-
ally interpreted as evidence against it is the Allais para-
dox, again a highly robust fmding. For a detailed discus-
sion largely from an economic perspective, see AUais and
Hagen (1979). I need not describe it again, except to point
out that it has been demonstrated only when the gambles
are presented in normal, not extensive, form. This means
that what is demonstrated to be false is the combination
of monotonicity and the reduction, via an accounting
equivalence, from extensive to normal form. Little ex-
perimentation has been done on monotonicity when the
extensive form is retained, but what exists supports
monotonicity (Keller. 1985; Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). If that is correct, then the paradox really proves
only that people do not see that formally equivalent gam-
bles are indifferent. Although descriptive validity of
monotonicity is far from certain, in my opinion there is no
compelling reason at present to reject it. Furthermore,
many commentators feel it is on a par with transitivity as
an unambiguous principle of rational behavior.
Likelihood dominance was first made descriptively
suspect by EUsberg (1961) by means of the gedanken
paradox now named after him, and nothing since then has
made it look more satisfactory. Since the main role of
likelihood dominance in the theory is to establish the
finite additivity of the probability measure, dropping it
forces one to representations in which probabilities are
replaced by weights with somewhat weaker properties
than those of probability. Tversky (1967) ran an empirical
study under conditions quite different from the Ellsberg
paradox that showed the incompatibility of SEU and ad-
ditive weights.
Finally, there are the accounting equivalences—
including the many reductions from extensive to normal
form. Actually, and perhaps surprisingly, very little data
exists on such equivalences. When the problem of uni-
versal accounting is clearly formulated, most psycholo-
gists are deeply suspicious as to whether such insights
into the structure of gambles are very widespread. Cer-
tainly, anyone who has taught decision theory is aware
that many students have grave difficulty in seeing
through the structure of any beyond the simplest ac-
counting equivalences. It is in this respect that subjects'
rationality is most bounded, to use a phrase first intro-
duced by Simon (1955. 1978). 1 believe theorists should
be very circumspect in postulating accounting equiva-
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lences, and experimentalists need to seek out those (few,
I suspect) that appear descriptively valid. Which ones are
postulated makes a good deal of difference in the result-
ing theory.
One problematic feature of these accounting equiva-
lences is how to interpret the order in which events are
carried out. The classes of theories being discussed do
not include time as a variable, but quite clearly any em-
pirical realization of a decision tree does have a strong
temporal aspect. This is a clear failing of the modeling.
A mathematically disturbing aspect of giving up on the
reduction to normal form is that a full theory for binary
gambles does not extend in any automatic way to gam-
bles with three distinct consequences, and one for three
consequences does not extend in any simple way to ei-
ther two or four, and so on. Thus. I first describe some
binary theories that generalize binary SEU. and then turn
to a generalization for finite, first-order gambles that is of
a slightly different character.
EVENT COMMUTATIVITY AND BINARY
RANK-DEPENDENT REPRESENTATIONS
The first utility paper in which the idea of rank depen-
dence appeared is Quiggin (1982); it provided a rank-
dependent generalization of expected utility theory of
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1974). (Yarrai (1987)
gave a somewhat different axiomatization that leads to a
special case of Quiggin.) The basic idea of Quiggin's
(1982) rank-dependent representation is as follows: When
the events are rank ordered according to preference for
the consequences that are attached to them by the gam-
ble, then the utility of the gamble is calculated to be a
weighted average of the utilities of the money conse-
quences with the weights being constructed as follows.
The weight associated to the (th event is the difference
between two similar terms. The first is a fixed function of
the probability of the union of that /th event together with
all inferior events. The second is that same function of
the probability of the union of all inferior events. Such
"expectations" with nonadditive weights of this type are
examples of Choquet (1953-54) integrals, as seems first to
have been recognized by Schmeidler (1984). These inte-
grals are described fully in Chapter VI of Wakker (1989).
Two types of modification of this axiomatization have
appeared subsequently. Schmeidier (1984) and Gilboa
(1987) give rank-dependent generalizations of Savage's
(1954) subjective-expected utility which decisions are de-
fined over a fixed set of states of nature of unknown
probabilities. There the weights are the difference of non-
additive measures on the two sets of events, which again
are Choquet integrals. Luce and Narens (1985) and Luce
(1988) explore the generalization to events, also with un-
known probability, but instead of acts over a fixed set of
states each gamble is conditional on some individual
event such as the toss of a coin, a throw of a die, or the
unknown composition of colored balls in an um. It gen-
eralizes mixture space ideas. The work being discussed
here generalizes these last two papers to theories that are
both rank- and sign-dependent, and so 1 shall focus only
on them.
It should be emphasized that, unlike SEU where all
the accounting equivalences hold, the issue of how the
domain of gambles is formulated is extremely important.
The lack of empirical realism in the Savage-type formu-
lation becomes acute in the rank-dependent theories.
Luce and Narens (1985) looked into the question of
finding the most general interval-scale theory of binary
utility on the following assumptions: indefinite iterations
of binary gambles and a preference ordering that is tran-
sitive and connected (weak order), monotonic, and sat-
isfies two of the simplest accounting equivalences,
namely.
1. Idempotence: for all consequences a and events E
a; (2)
2. Event Commutativity: for all consequences a and b
and events E and F,
(3)
The first of these is a triviality. The second simply says
that if a is the consequence when E and F both occur and
b is the consequence otherwise, then it is immaterial in
which order E and F are carried out. The main doubt is
not subjects' ability to see through the logic, which many
seem to do, but a possible preference in having one event
run before the other.
Luce and Narens (1985) showed (see also Luce, 1988,
for a refinement in the use of event commutativity) that
together with some more technical assumptions about the
richness of the domain, these assumptions imply the ex-
istence of an order preserving utility function U and two
weighting functions S> and S< that map events into (0,1)
such that for all consequences a and b and events E
[I - S>(E)]U(/>), if a
[1 - S
S>(E)U(fl)
S<(E)U(a)
This representation is said to be rank dependent, abbre-
viated RD, because the weights depend upon the rank
order of the consequences. In other respects it is much
like SEU. It entails transitivity, monotonicity, idempo-
tence, and event commutativity, but not the other ac-
counting equivalences of SEU theory.
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The number of weights can be reduced from two to
one by adding a further rational accounting equivalence
that may well be descriptively accurate, namely,
ao^h - bo-,^a. (5)
where ~iE means "not E." This forces the relation:
S>(E) -H S<(-nE) = 1.
A general rank-dependent theory for gambles with any
finite number of distinct consequences is given in Luce
(1988), but since it is a special case of the representation
of Eq. (11) below I do not attempt to describe it here.
The key empirical issue about this iterated binary
rank-dependent theory is the three simple accounting
Eqs. (2), (3), and (5), but there is little to report yet on
this. However, widespread belief and indirect evidence
suggests that the representation of Eq. (4) is inadequate
because it fails to reflect the very distinctive role played
by the status quo in decision making. There is no place
for that in a purely rank-dependent theory. So we turn to
a generalization that admits a special role for the status
quo.
RANK- AND SIGN-DEPENDENT UTILITY
Gains, Losses, and the Status Quo
Everyone speaks of gains and losses, and almost ev-
eryone reacts to them differently. For example, the intu-
itive concept of riskiness—although not the formal Pratt-
Arrow definition that is widely accepted by economists—
seems to focus largely on losses (Luce & Weber, 1986;
Weber, 1988). As early as 1952 Markowitz discussed the
form of the utility function on either side of no change
from the status quo. Edwards (1962) pointed out that if
the weights fail to add to 1, for which he adduced empir-
ical reasons, then necessarily the representation of utility
is as a ratio scale, not an interval one. This invited spec-
ulation about the (invariant) zero of such a scale, and
Edwards (1962) suggested that the status quo was a nat-
ural possibility. Probably the most extensive recent such
discussion is that of Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
whose prospect theory assigns to the status quo a very
special role. In particular, there is a major difference in
computing the utility of gambles whose consequences are
both on the same side relative to the status quo from
those that span it. Indeed, their theory exhibits both a
rank-dependent aspect and a sign-dependent one.
My purpose is, first, to describe more fully the nature
of weighted linear representations that are both rank and
sign dependent, and then to describe one way to arrive at
that representation using some "plausible" accounting
equivalences that are based on having an operation of
joint receipt of gambles. General results about concate-
nation structures with singular points, like maxima, min-
ima, and no change from the status quo, are worked out
in Luce (1990). and the utility results described below are
in Luce (in press) and Luce and Fishburn (in press). It
should be noted that when a structure has singular points,
its representation is as a ratio scale rather than an interval
scale. Thus, forins far more general than weighted aver-
ages arc possible. They are fully characterized for the
binary case, but not more generally. These have not yet
been investigated within the context of preferences
among gambles, but these richer possibilities should not
be ignored.
The RSD Representation of Preferences Between
Binary Gambles
Let e denote no change from the status quo. Purely
formally, one can generalize the rank-dependent repre-
sentation to take into account both the relation of a to b
and each to e. This yields:
U(fl)S>+(E) ^
U(a)S<"'(E) H
U(a)S>^(E) 1
U(fl)S<"(E) H
U(fl)S> (E) H
U(a)S<-(E) H
h U(/?)[l
h U(^)[l
^ U(fe)[l
^ U(^)[I
h U(/7)[l
r U(6)[l
- S>+(E)], if a
~ S<^(E)], if ^
- S>-(E)], if a
- S<+(E)], if ^
— S> (L)J, II e
- S<-(E)], if e
^ b ^
a
b
a
(6)
I refer to this as a rank- and sign-dependent utility rep-
resentation, abbreviated RSD (Luce, in press).
Note that, like prospect theory, the RSD representa-
tion is unique up to multiplication by a positive constant,
and so it is a ratio scale theory, not an interval scale one.
This arises because of the highly special role of the con-
sequence e, which is totally unlike any other conse-
quence. By setting a = b ^ e inthQ representation, it is
easy to see that either the weights are independent of
sign, resulting in the purely rank dependent representa-
tion, or \J(e) = 0.
Relation of Binary RSD UtiUty to Other Theories
The four weighting functions can be collapsed into
fewer by various assumptions.
If the weights are independent of sign:
(7)
then RSD-utility reduces to the RD representation.
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If the weights are independent of order:
(8)
then RSD-utility reduces to a purely sign-dependent rep-
resentation (which can be shown to lead to an implausible
prediction).
If the diagonals are equated:
and (9)
then the result is a slight generahzation of Kahneman and
Tversky's (1979) prospect theory for binary gambles. It
reduces exactly to binary prospect theory by adding the
rational accounting equivalence (5). For the RSD-model.
this is equivalent to:
Letting = S, the representation becomes
\]{a)S{E) + V{b)[\ -
U(fl)S(E)
or e ^ b ^ a
or b ^ e ^ a,
V(a)[[ - S(-nE)] -t- U(6)S(-iE). if b ^ a ^ e
or e S: a 5: b
(10)
which is binary prospect theory.
A RSD Representation for First-Order Gambles
As was earlier noted, once we abandon the assumption
of universal accounting equivalences, the binary theory
does not automatically extend to a theory of gambles of
any finite size. One needs to consider carefully the gen-
eral form of the representation, explore its relation to the
binary theory, and axiomatize it. In this subsection 1 de-
scribe one proposal (Luce & Fishbum. in press) that is a
natural generalization of prospect theory and that agrees
with the general RD theory of Luce (1988) for gambles
whose consequences are either all gains or all losses.
Let £ denote an algebra of events^ and C a set of pure
consequences, such as money or consumer items, but not
gambles. Within (^, let ^ be a special consequence which
intuitively should be thought of as no change from the
status quo or, more generally, from an aspiration level. It
is the null consequence.
is a collection of subevents of an event such that if, E.F^f, then
A first-order gamble is a function g from a finite par-
tition {Ey} of E€^' into /O. A second-order gamble is a
mapping into the set of first-order ones, including the
pure consequences. Let ^J denote all the first-order gam-
bles as well as those second-order ones characterized
below by the axioms. Preference over ^ is written S.
Suppose g is a. first-order gamble based on the parti-
tion {Ey} of an event E. Denote by E(-l-) the union of all
subevents that give rise under ^ to a gain; by E(0), the
union of events giving rise to the null consequence e; and
by E( -), the union of events giving rise to a loss.
The representation involves an order preserving util-
ity function U over ^ and weighting functions S' into
[0,1] over event pairs (D,E) with D C E. Suppose that
g is a first-order gamble defined on the partition
{El E^_i,E^, E^ + i EJ and g(Ey) is the con-
sequence associated to Ey. Suppose the subevents have
been labelled from best to worst, that is, ^(Ey) > g(Ey+,),
J = 1, . . . ,rt - 1. and ^(E^) = e. Then,
m-i
-f-
(11)
where the weights W', / = + . - . are explicit functions of
the S' which I need not write here. Further, if h is a
second-order gamble on a partition (E^, E^, E'} such
that h{E'*^) = h^ is a first-order gamble of pure gains,
/i(E**) = e, and/i(E") = /i~ is a first-order gamble of pure
losses, then
. (12)
This representation, like that of prospect theory which it
generalizes, partitions any gamble involving both gains
and losses into those two parts, and the weights assigned
to them do not generally add to I. If one focuses on just
gains, then the representation is a pure rank-dependent
one of the type discussed in Luce (1988) in which the
weights W"^ do add to 1. The same is true of the losses.
As written, this representation does not imply that
gambles are strictly monotonic increasing in conse-
quences, except for the binary ones. For monotonicity to
hold for all first-order gambles, it is necessary and suffi-
cient that there exists functions S' over events such that
S'(D|E) =
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AN AXIOMATIZATION OF RSD UTILITY
Additivity of Utility Over the Joint Receipt
of Consequences
Let ® be a binary operation over the underlying space
of alternatives, where g ® h denotes the joint receipt of
both g and h, whether they are gambles or pure conse-
quences. An experimental realization of ® is the duplex
gambles first employed by Slovic and Lichtenstein
(1968). The axiomatic theory that I describe involves the
joint axiomatization of © along with more usual proper-
ties of gambles. (We have yet to discover an axiomatiza-
tion that avoids introducing ©). One feature of the result-
ing utility function, U, is that in the presence of other
assumptions below it is highly restricted in form, as is
derived in Luce and Fishbum (in press). The simplest
special case, which was studied in Luce (in press) and
leads to the easiest to describe results, has U additive
over ©, that is.
(13)
Such an assumption of additivity goes contrary to a
good deal of accepted belief, but with the flexibility pro-
vided by sign- and rank-dependent weights, it may not be
as troublesome as one first thinks. I give one example
below having to do with the asymmetry of gains and
losses.
Before going into that, however, explicit mention
should be made of the basic "irrationality" embodied in
the additivity assumption. Given the joint receipt of two
gambles, a and h, a rational analysis would say that they
should first be convolved and then the normal form gam-
ble should be subjected to a utility analysis. The additiv-
ity hypotheses says otherwise: each gamble is evaluated
separately and one simply adds the resulting utilities. For
example, many of us buy both car and house insurance.
Do you convolve the risks before making your decisions
about the coverage to take? I have yet to fmd anyone who
claims to do so. Each is evaluated in isolation as a distinct
risk.
A number of applications of the binary additive RSD
theory are given in Luce (in press). Included are defini-
tions of buying and selling price in terms of ©. These are
shown to be different from one another and also different
from choice indifference under RSD theory, although not
in some of its special cases, such as prospect theory. It
follows readily from these definitions why people buy
both lotteries and insurance. It also follows that judged
indifferences will differ from choice indifference if sub-
jects are in fact stating either a buying or a selling price.
Finally, it is shown how to use money gambles to esti-
mate the four weighting functions provided one has a
suitable way of establishing choice indifferences.
Form of the Utility Function for Money
In the presence of some of the other axioms given
below, additive utility for money can be shown to have
the following power function representation (Luce, in
press): There exist positive constants kij) and
4-, -, such that for real x
For many purposes, this appears to permit adequate flex-
ibility. In particular, it does not establish any special
symmetry between gains and losses unless one makes the
added assumption that for money x © y ^ x -I- y. In that
case, utility is simply proportional to money. One might
first think that this assumption is automatic, but a great
deal depends upon the exact interpretation given to ©.
For example, if one thinks of it as successive receipt in
time, then it is not so clear that first gaining x and then
losing it is the same as x - x = 0. Even with this as-
sumption, the RSD theory retains much asymmetry of
gambles, as discussed in the next subsection. Using the
more general form for U that they derived. Luce and
Fishburn (in press) arrive at a second, interesting class of
utility functions for money that have the property of ini-
tially exhibiting diminishing marginal utility but, after a
point, changing over to growing marginal utility.
Asymmetry of Reflected Gambles With a Symmetric
Utility Function
In contrast to prospect theory, additive RSD utility
does not require any special assumptions about the asym-
metry of U for gains and losses in order to accommodate
the observed asymmetry of positive and negative gam-
bles. Suppose U of money is symmetric in the sense that:
U($ - x) = ~-V($x).
Consider additive RSD utility applied to x > y > e.
(E)], [U(x) -
which is zero, and so
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if and only if (he basic property giving rise to prospect
theory obtains, namely. Eq. (9).
Thus, the following three suppositions are inconsis-
tent:
• prospect theory.
• additive utility that is symmetric for money, and
• the existence of an asymmetry between a gamble and
its reflection.
But if prospect theory is not assumed, then gambling
decisions may exhibit such an asymmetry without having
to impose an asymmetry on the utiUty function itself.
The Major Axioms for Additive RSD Utility of Finite
First-Order Gambles
The axioms that lead to the representation of Eqs. (11)
and (12) are grouped into three distinct classes, the first
of which consists of three structural ones. The first struc-
tural axiom assumes that (§7, S:) is a continuum. The
second says that for each gamble there is a pure conse-
quence (e.g., a sum of money) that is indifferent to it.
And the third, which defines the extent to which second-
order gambles must be involved, begins with any first-
order gamble g, constructs its formally equivalent, sec-
ond-order, sign-partitioned one. g2, that partitions g into
subgambles over E( +), E(0). and E( -). and asserts that
g2 is a gamble in ^?.
As an example, suppose E is an event (such as the toss
of a die) having a partition into six subevents E,. / =
1, ... ,6, and let g be the gamble:
event: Ej E2 E3 E4 E5 E^
consequence: $10 1 0 -5 -25 -100
Then g2 is the following second-order gamble:
event: E, U ET
consequence:
E(-) =
E3 E4 U E5 U
0
4 U E5
where g(-i-) and g(-) are the two (conditional) gambles:
event: E, E2 and E4 E, E^,
consequence: $10 1 $-5 -25 -100
The second group of axioms captures several aspects
of rationality. The first assumes that binary gambles ex-
hibit monotonicity in the consequences. As was re-
marked earlier, this also appears to be reasonably de-
scriptive. We do not know if more general monotonicity
is also descriptive, but we do not need that assumption to
arrive at Eqs. (11) and (12).
The second rationality condition postulates three
things: transitivity of preference; that {^, ©, e) is a math-
ematical group'', and monotonicity between the binary
operation of joint receipt. ®, and the preference ordering.
S. This with the continuum assumption implies the ex-
istence of an order preserving function U on ^ that is
additive over the operation ©, which was discussed ear-
lier. As was noted there. Luce and Fishburn (in press) do
give a somewhat less restrictive axiomatization and rep-
resentation, but it is sufficiently complex that I do not go
into here.
The third rationality axiom is an accounting equiva-
lence, namely, that for any gamble g, its second-order,
sign-partitioned equivalent form gj is in fact indifferent to
it, that is, g ~ gj. I am not aware of any data on this
assumption, but I believe that it is fairly natural for peo-
ple to reframe gambles by partitioning them according to
gains and losses, as in the above example.
The last rationality assumption is a form of distribution
relating gambles to the operation ©. It turns out to be the
source of rank dependence in the theory. Nonetheless, as
stated it seems highly rational and nonobjectionable. De-
fine G in terms of © as follows: for c > b, d — c O biS
c --- b © d. In the presence of the assumptions made so
far. one can show that c O b always exists. If g is a
first-order gamble consisting of only gains and c is the
smallest gain, then let g' denote the gamble generated
from g by subtracting c (using G) from each consequence
of g. The assertion is that g is indifferent to g' © c. A
similar statement holds for any first-order gamble with
only losses, subtracting the smallest loss from all of the
others. This assumption was discussed informally by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and to some degree it
seems a highly rational reframing. It is a special case of
Pfanzagl's (1959) consistency principle.
The description "plausible" of my title refers both to
the consistency principle, which while rational in some
sense certainly goes beyond the traditional axioms of ra-
tionality, and the next assumption, which we have called
a decomposition axiom. It involves an assertion of indif-
ference between gambles, but unlike the superficially
similar rationality assertions, the gambles involved in
these indifferences are not formally equivalent. The at-
tempt is to capture something that is heuristic and de-
scriptive, but irrational.
The decomposition axiom says that any second-order,
sign-partitioned gamble is judged indifferent to the joint
receipt of two independent gambles, one of which is the
subgamble of gains on E( -I-) pitted against the null con-
sequence on E(0) U E( -) and the other of which is the
"*© is associative, e is the identity, and inverses exist.
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subgamble of losses on E( -) pitted against the null con-
sequence on E( -K) U E(0). This assumption in effect pos-
tulates a major point of irrationality on the part of deci-
sion makers in dealing with gambles having both positive
and negative consequences.
Returning to our previous example, this decomposi-
tion axiom says that the given g is indifferent to the joint
receipt of:
E(-h) -
event: E, U E,
consequence:
together with
event:
consequence:
E3 U E4 U E5 U
0
U
E{-) =
U E3 E4 U E5 U
0
This assumption requires experimental exploration to
see just how descriptive it actually is. Data in Slovic and
Lichtenstein (1968) support it in the sense that most of
their subjects failed to distinguish between a binary gam-
ble with a gain and a loss and the joint receipt of the gain
versus nothing and the loss versus nothing (so-called,
duplex gambles).
One can show that the axioms just listed imply the
representation given in Eqs. (11) and (12), and that the
representation implies all but the structural ones. Specif-
ically, it implies all of the rationality assumptions to-
gether with the last, nonrational assumption.
The theory has not yet been extended to general,
higher-order or compound gambles. The difficulty in do-
ing so resides in my uncertainty about how to cope with
compound gambles whose component gambles each in-
clude both gains and losses. To be specific, suppose g
and h are first-order gambles that each involve gains and
losses, and suppose g > e > h. Consider the second-
order gamble/on the event partition {G,E,H} such that
ytG) = g,f{E) = e, and/(H) = h. It is not obvious to me
whether we should generalize Eq. (12) to apply in this
case, i.e..
or whether / should be replaced by its equivalent first-
order gamble which then is partitioned into gains and
losses and Eq. (12) applied, or something else. Some data
probably would be helpful in guiding the generalization.
Clearly much work needs to be done both to generalize
and to investigate the adequacy of these axioms. Also, it
would be desirable to arrive at an axiomatization that did
not require the introduction of ©. One possible avenue
might be to use conjoint methods on binary gambles with
the null consequence.
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